Narcissus Gets a Divorce

Narcissus admires his reflection.

In my decades of divorce practice, I've encountered folks who, if a psychological evaluation was completed, would be characterized as having narcissistic personality disorder.  A few of these peeps have been clients; others have been on the opposing side.

Either way, everyone involved is in for a rough ride.

Over the past several years, "narcissism" has also taken on a connotation-du-jour.  The diagnosis being made by dime-store psychologists (i.e. parties to family court litigation) whenever the object takes an opposing or contrary view. 

What is narcissim, really?

According to the Mayo Clinic, narcissistic personality disorder is "characterized by dramatic, emotional behavior, which is in the same category as antisocial and borderline personality disorders."   A person with this personality disorder may exhibit some of the following characteristics, according to the Clinic:

• Believing you are better than others;
• Fantasizing about your success, power and attractiveness;
• Exaggerating your achievements or talents;
• Expecting constant praise and admiration;
• Ignoring other's feelings and emotions;
• Believing and acting like you are really, really special;
• Taking advantage of others;
• Expecting others to go along with your often super-sized schemes and plans;
• Exhibiting jealousy toward others;
• Believing others are jealous of you;
• Unable to maintain healthy inter-personal relationships;
• Easily hurt or rejected;
• Fragile self-esteem

If you know someone with more than a few of these traits, run.  If you are married to such a person, get ready for the inevitable divorce proceeding when you finally throw in the towel, realizing that your spouse will never change. 

If you are a lawyer representing such a person, affix your chin strap and bring a lunch.

In the divorce context, the narcissist fares quite poorly.  The above-listed features of this personality disorder are routinely identifed and rigorously addressed by family court professionals. 

In this process, the personality flaws of the narcissist are forced itno the lab for a full-on forensic evaluation.  Many of the tools in the family court professional's arsenal will be brought to bear upon the conduct of the narcissist in an effort to force short-term modification, and to achieve a stable platform.

Some red flags that I've gleaned over the years: a narcissist will change lawyers often, blaming the status of the case on the mistakes of prior legal counsel.  Also, the register of actions in the case of a narcissist will often be a mile long, peppered with hearings, motions, and more hearings.

When a narcissist is embroiled in a divorce proceeding, the children are used as pawns.  Any input from the Friend of the Court [either via a referee, family counselor, or social worker] or from a therapist, is rejected; the narcissistic parent must be dragged to court, kicking, screaming and cursing.

In the years leading up to such a divorce, the other spouse will often report being chronically verbally abused and bullied by the narcissist.  In fact, this dynamic will set the initial tone of the proceeding.

The process will next feature a series of attempts, which will take some time, where the professionals try to arrest the insidious and pervasive conduct of the narcissist.  Arrest, but not change; this person will not change.

The other spouse many times will exhibit classic signs of emotional abuse during this painful process: low self-esteem, exhaustion, a desire to give up or give in.  This person needs a strong focused divorce lawyer.

And counseling. 

During the divorce process, the other spouse is well advised to minimize the face-to-face contacts with the narcissist.  If children are involved, then communicate through emails and texts. 

If you feel threatened at home or during parenting exchanges, seek exclusive use of the marital home.  If you are separated, use a neutral transition point for the parenting exchanges; most family court judges will grant such a request simply to err on the side of everyone's safety.

Finally, stay focused on the process knowing that the process will eventually come to an end.  The Michigan Supreme Court has mandated that county family courts conclude divorce proceedings within a year.

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Child Obesity as a Custody Factor in Family Court

Yesterday, the NBC Today Show featured a segment on family court cases where a parent was mounting a child custody challenge based on obesity.  This past year, I recall hearing much about the subject of childhood obesity, perhaps due to the First Lady's "Let's Move" campaign.

According to a recent report by the Center for Disease Control, childhood obesity affects 17% of our nation's youth; a figure triple what it was just a generation ago.  Now that this is a recognized condition putting on the cloak of yet another national crisis, should family court judges take childhood obesity into account in the custody calculus?

The father featured in the Today Show segment was shown cooking a vegetarian meal for his two preteen children.  He succeeded in his custody ploy to the extent the family court judge modified  custody such that the children stayed at dad's house during the weeks of the school year.

In Michigan, the Child Custody Act sets forth several factors which a family court judge must consider when deciding a custody dispute.  One of these factors is the capacity of a parent to provide food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care.  Arguably, this factor could include how a parent manages a child's diet; particularly if that child is at risk for obesity or is, in fact, obese.


The relative physical health of the parents and the reasonable preference of the child (particularly if older than age 12) could also come into play in a childhood obesity custody case.  A parent's unhealthy lifestyle may factor into the family court judge's calculus.


In come cases, it may strike the judge as unfair to basically penalize a parent for the child's eating habits.  This is a particularly close case where the obesity may be genetic and thus, hereditary.  Also, how far does the family court go?  


The optimal situation, of course, is where both parties co-parent with the child's best interests in mind.  Diet, exercise and lifestyle, however, often do not mesh between divorced parents.


As our nation continues it's struggle against the bulge, the cases of the type featured on the Today Show may pop up with more regularity in the county family courts across the state.  We all want the best for your young children.  Certainly, a good diet is an important component to a good healthy upbringing.

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By the Numbers: Clarkston Legal Production 2011

In my law practice, I drive from various courts across Michigan in a 2009 Ford Explorer.  That vehicle has 110,000 miles burned into it over the past 3-years.  That's a lot of court appearances.

Here are the numbers behind those miles for this past calendar year.


Michigan Court of Appeals.  Although I had not argued before the Court of Appeals in more than two years, I had 4 arguments before the intermediate appellate tribunal in 2011.  Also filed 25 briefs in that court; most of them applications for leave to appeal guilty pleas.  In the first week of 2012, I have two arguments.

Oakland County.  This is where we hold a "home field" advantage.  In 2011, I appeared in the circuit court, including the family court division, 118 times.  An additional 86 appearances were made in the Oakland County Probate Court.  Getting to know the judges pretty well over there.

Getting to know the Friend of the Court Referees as well with 30 trips to the FOC for early intervention conferences, or evidentiary hearings.

Macomb County.  Went "East Side" for 24 court appearances in 2011, all of them in the circuit or family courts; no East Side probate court appearances this year.  Many of these were for the Attorney General.

Wayne County.  In 2011, we made 20 court appearances in the "D"; fifteen were in the circuit and family courts, while the remaining 5 were all in the Wayne County Probate Court.

Genesee County.  Just to the North of our offices [we can be in Flint in less than a half hour], I made the dash to the Genesee County Circuit Court 10 times in 2011.  In addition, we made 4 trips to the Genesee Friend of the Court for hearings.

Livingston County.  Only five appearances in Livingston County Circuit Court this year; all on a single divorce case.

District Courts.  In 2011, we appeared in many of the various district courts placed throughout the counties in which we appear.  80 district court appearances to be precise; most of them for criminal matters.

Administrative Hearings.  Only three of these this year; for drivers license restorations and an implied consent refusal.

Keep in mind folks, these statistics are for but one attorney in the Karlstrom Cooney law firm; my partners have many other court appearances in these courts.  They do have, however, more "transactional" law practices than mine.  Along with Kay Caruso, Stuart Cooney, and Peter Keenan, we are the firm's litigators.

So these are my numbers for this year; it was a productive one.  We have our clients to thank for keeping us well engaged.

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Post-Divorce Nesting

Brown Bird Design for Time

This week in Time Magazine, there is a story in the "Society" section about a mode of parenting known as, "Nesting".  This is where divorced parents each secure a residence beyond the former marital home; the couple's children remain in the marital home, to "nest".

The theory behind nesting is that it seeks to minimize the sense of upheaval that children of school age often experience during and after their parent's divorce.

Time's Belinda Luscombe speculates that the nesting mode of post-divorce parenting has emerged over the past decade as an innovative version of co-parenting.  It remains rare, however, to get both parents on the same page be able to pull it off.

In the past decade, I have completed nearly 250 divorces and only two of those featured a nesting arrangement.  Of those two cases, one of nests was destroyed, via foreclosure.

On the other hand, the difficult real estate market has forced many divorcing couples to hang onto their former marital home; like it or not.  Nesting would seem to be a viable option.  Usually, however, one of the parents "takes one for the team" and remains in the marital home, or the couple "walks away" from the home to begin their new post-divorce lives under the cloud of foreclosure.

Proponents assert that the nesting arrangement eliminates the continuous shuffling between two homes by the children that comes with a traditional parenting schedule; the parents do the shuffling in a nesting arrangement.  Also, for children of a certain age, the arrangement allows them to continue living and going to school in a familiar environment, their childhood home, while they adjust to their parents' divorce.

Most family court judges look upon nesting arrangements with a certain degree of skepticism, if not outright scorn.  In family court, however, parents are free to make whatever arrangements they desire so long as the judge can be convinced it is in best interests of the children involved in the case.

As a temporary post-divorce parenting technique between two cooperating amiable co-parents, nesting can work.  It very well may provide the minor children with a better opportunity to adjust to the strains of divorce.

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So You Want to Be a Circuit Judge

Good news!  Governor Rick Snyder has put out an official notice for applications to fill a seat opening up on the Wayne County Circuit Court vacated by Michigan Supreme Court Justice Mary Beth Kelly.  Here is the application, should you be an interested practicing attorney living in Wayne County.

Some fantastic Wayne Circuit Judges have come from gubernatorial appointments; Michigan Supreme Court Justice Brian Zahra comes to mind.

Although not completely clear, this current spot will probably be on the family court, so you would preside over a steady diet of divorces and custody battles.

Once you get appointed, don't get too comfortable; the State Court Administrative Office has slated one Wayne County judgeship for elimination no later than January 2013.  Wayne County Executive Robert Ficano is calling for more judicial eliminations given Detroit's declining population.

Upon your completion of the judicial term to which you were appointed, if you wanted to keep your job, you would have to run for election on the Wayne County non-partisan ballot.  Don't miss those deadlines; and better start raising funds now for your election.

If this sounds good to you, then download the attached form and get cracking on those references; the Governor's deadline is fast approaching.

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When Your Children Live with a Murderer Endorsed by the Family Court

A very worried Trisha Conlon

This bizarre family law custody case is playing out in Seattle, WA.  The unusual facts of the case bring into sharp focus the challenge of putting parents' often-questionable decisions through review by a family court judge.

In 1995 Trisha Conlon married Marine fighter pilot John Cushing, Jr.; a man with a tragic past.  His ex-wife, Kristine Cushing, shot to death their two young daughters, 4 and 8, while they slept in their Southern California home.  This was in 1991, when Mr. Cushing was on active duty in the Marine Corps and Mrs. Cushing, by all accounts, was an ideal soccer Mom.

Kristine Cushing's murder trial featured the now infamous "Prozac Defense"; she was found guilty by reason of insanity and sentenced to a mental institution where she did a nickle, followed by a decade of intensive in-patient style psychiatric treatment.  She was discharged without restriction in 2005.

Meanwhile, John Cushing tried to put the pieces of his life back together.  He married Trisha Conlon, with whom he had two sons.  Sadly yet predictably, the couple divorced in 2004.  Mr. Cushing's next "life-choice" was to re-marry his first wife, Kristine Cushing, the now-excused infanticidal murderess.

Today, Lt. Col. Cushing (retired) lives on Vashon Island, WA with a split-custody arrangement whereby one of his sons lives with him; the other lives with Ms. Conlon.  The brothers reunite during holidays and vacations.  Under this custody arrangement, Conlon eventually became aware that her ex-spouse not only re-married his first wife, but also shared a marital home with her and Conlon's son.

This information was difficult to come by as Mr. Cushing attempted to conceal his family arrangements.  The distance between the two parents provided the necessary cover.  Ms. Conlon, now living in Oregon, resorted to her family law attorney and his private investigator.

Seeking a change in custody to place her son into her home, Conlon brought proof of the Cushing reunification to the attention of the family court in King County, Washington (Seattle), arguing the arrangement was a "change in circumstance" detrimental to her son's best interests.  She lost her case last month; a hearing on appeal is set for next week.

This case is a testament to the lengths people will go in the name of love, marriage, and progenitorship. Many, perhaps most of us, would not make the same decision as the Lt. Col. in this case; infanticide is just a flat-out "deal-breaker".  On the other hand, imagine the love and forgiveness Cushing must have for his first wife to be able to take such a risk.

To the extent that his decision has placed his son in harm's path, it will be up to a family court judge of the King County Superior Court in Seattle to determine what is best for the boy under its jurisdiction.

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Proposed Divorce Legislation Distinguishes Marital From Separate Property

Two new bills pending in the Michigan legislature attempt to address a long-perceived problem in Michigan family law: how to classify property [separate or marital] in a divorce proceeding.  This legislative proposal has judges and divorce attorneys up in arms.

The tie-barred bills, 4672 and 4673, introduced by Livonia Republican John Walsh, propose standards for the division of marital property, and comingled marital and separate property; create a presumption of non-division for separate property; and revises the procedures by which a family court could "invade" one spouse's separate property and award it to the other spouse.

In Michigan, a family court judge's power to apportion property in a divorce comes strictly from statutes; a confusing patchwork of four separate statutes, to be precise.  Because of this legislative patchwork, a significant body of common law has developed over the past 30-years addressing the classification and division of property.

Although every divorce case is decided on its own merit, the present state of divorce law allows the distinct possibility, if sufficent and compelling factors are proven, for the invasion of separate property.  The new legislation is largely viewed as making such an invasion more difficult, if not impossible.

Birmingham divorce attorney James P. Cunningham summarized the problem in a 2008 Michigan Bar Journal article, calling for legislation to "fill the gap" between the cases.  Cunningham was on the floor of the house in Lansing last week to testify as an expert about the need for this legislation and, presumably, to endorse the content of Walsh's bills.

So why such a fuss from the family court bench and bar?  First, they contend that Walsh is fast-tracking the legislation without input from their professional organizations.  Second, these groups also assert the proposed measures are grossly unfair to the non-propertied spouse.

When cornered by a reporter at the Capitol last week, a lobbist for the bills denied they were being fast-tracked but wryly noted that the family court bar was a veritable "graveyard" for good ideas.

Is this going to be a case of the rich getting richer?  The so-called "missionaries for the family" certainly think so and are determined to quash the measures; you should have seen the chatter about these bills appearing on the State Bar of Michigan's Family Law listserve...

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SCOTUS: No Right to Attorney in Child Support Civil Contempt Proceeding

As the High Court's term comes to an end this week, SCOTUS is issuing opinions by the day.  One of those announced this week was the South Carolina case involving a father's contempt proceeding for failure to pay his child support.

The case, Turner v Rogers, involved a series of contempt proceedings conducted in the family court.  Father failed to pay his support, so he was repeatedly jailed, once for a 12-month stint.  Neither father nor mother were represented by counsel in the proceedings.

The case wound its way through the South Carolina court system.  By the time the case arrived at the SCOTUS, Turner had long-completed his 12-month stint in the county jail.

SCOTUS, in reversing his conviction, nevertheless held that a person involved in civil contempt hearings, as a matter of Due Process, was not entitled to an attorney.  The reasons for this are because the opposing party is not the state but rather, the mother of the children.  Also, the High Court found that in such proceedings, Due Process is satisfied by providing the support payor with a form to elicit financial information, providing him notice of a hearing, and by conducting a brief hearing on the payor's finances relative to his obligation.

In this case, Turner's conviction was reversed (even though he completed his jail stint) because he was not provided with a financial disclosure form, was not provided an attorney, and the family court erred by failing to make relevant factual findings that father was able to make the support payments when it found him in contempt.  Basic stuff.

Here is a piece of scholarly criticism of this SCOTUS decision in the blog Concurring Opinions that has already shown up in the blogosphere.

Bottom line: pay your child support obligations.

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Fathers See Gains in County Family Courts

Do the regularly maintained statistics support the contention that fathers are getting more time with their children in family courts?  To borrow a lyric from the 70’s band, Boston, “it’s more than a feeling”.

 

Divorce records maintained by the Michigan Department of Community Health reflect a trend that family law professionals have observed, and perhaps helped influence; fathers with joint custody and equal parenting time.

While family law attorneys will no doubt acknowledge this trend, hard statistics are difficult to garner.  Custody is still decided on a “case-by-case”, county by county, basis.

The form used by MDCH to collect information about divorces has a field to designate custody of minor children involved in a case.  The person completing the form, usually an attorney, selects from the basic options of joint custody, or designates custody to mother, or father.

Per usual, however, the devil is in the details.  For many practicing family law, the formal custody designation set forth in a judgment of divorce or custody order is merely a label, and a poor one at that.

Joint legal custody is usually a given; an accepted starting point.  Physical custody, however, is a more contentious battlefield.  The phrase “physical custody” does not even appear in the Michigan Child Custody Act; it is a mechanism used by family law attorneys and family court judges to identify a custodial parent.

The more significant provision is the parenting schedule set forth in the judgment.  Not only does that schedule establish how much actual contact the minor children get with each parent, it also determines the child support obligation for each parent.

Purely anecdotal evidence from our recent divorce cases is consistent with the trend that Fathers are awarded joint custody (legal and physical) more often and, roughly, equal parenting time.  One size, however, does not fit all.

An article titled Throwaway Dads, from the Michigan Bar Journal from 10-years ago, decrying a gender bias against fathers, provides an interesting barometer relative to the climate change in Michigan’s county family courts.

There must be good reasons to establish where the children of a divorce will live, and even better reasons to limit them from the home of one of their parents.  Focusing on the parenting schedule rather than the custody label is the real trend at work here.

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The Skelton Divorce; An "Only in America" Moment

John and Tanya Skelton
in Lenawee County Circuit Court

I remember having a bad feeling about this story as it broke over the news during the Thanksgiving weekend last year.  Three young boys missing; clueless father.

Fast forward seven months and now we have the Skelton divorce in the Lenawee County Family Court making headlines.

In those intervening months, the three Skelton brothers have not surfaced.  For his part, their father simply states that he gave them to "an [unnamed] organization".

He stuck to this story, forcing his wife into a divorce trial where he represented himself in the proceedings before family court Judge Margaret Noe.  Accordingly, Judge Noe awarded custody, such as it is under the circumstances, to thier mother, Tanya Skelton.

As each month passes without any trace of the boys, the case grows ever colder.  The Lenawee County prosecutor has charged John Skelton with parental kidnapping; a capital offense with a potential life sentence. 

Regardless whether this case highlights the depth and horrifying scope of mental illness or, perhaps more ominously, it is a barometer of our post-modern culture, there will be no happy ending to this carnival side-show.

Only in America does a depraved father, who [at best] gave his three sons away to unknown individuals, seize headlines by insisting on a divorce trial where he represents himself; for the headlines, no doubt.  Alas, even his suicide attempt was botched.

Stay tuned, as our next debacle can only be moments away.

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Biological Father Cannot Parent His Law School Love Child

They were students at Cooley Law School in the late 1990s.  She was married; he was from Buffalo, New York. 

Their long-term adulterous affair eventually led to the birth of a child in 2002.  Although Mother's husband was on the birth certificates of both her children born during her marriage, she informed her law school lover that he was the biological father of the child born in 2002; subsequent DNA testing confirmed this fact.

When his love child was three years old, and armed with the confirming DNA results, bio-dad sought an order of filiation in a paternity action he filed in New York state.  For her part, Mother challenged the New York family court's jurisdiction, as the paternity suit did not name her husband as a necessary party, and the paternity of her second child was already established by operation of Michigan law.

Not so fast.  The New York family court found that some of the couples' adulterous liaisons took place within the state of New York thus, the child could have been conceived in that state.  Conceding that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Mother or her husband, and acknowledging that paternity of the child had been established in accord with Michigan law, the New York family court nevertheless refused to dismiss bio-dad's paternity action, ultimately granting bio-dad's order of filiation.

Meanwhile, paternity actions were cranked-up back here in the Wayne County family court by Mother's Husband and bio-dad.  All three parties sought summary disposition of the paternity issue.  Bio-dad's petition sought to enforce the order of filiation issued by the New York family court; the family court judge in Wayne County agreed, citing the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution.

Mother appealed and the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the Wayne County family court, holding that bio-dad lacked standing to sue here in Michigan.  The case hinged on the definition of a child born "out of wedlock".  The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the married couple did not seek a determination that their child was born out of wedlock, bio-dad cannot seek that determination, regardless of his New York order of filiation.

Bio-dad also asserted that the Wayne County family court was required to give his order from New York full force and effect under the United States Constitution.  In the most interesting portion of the published opinion, the Court of Appeals rejected bio-dad's assertion, holding that the comity clause of the constitution does not apply when the issuing court lacks jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the New York court conceded it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Husband, and that the New York family court left enforcement of the order it issued to the courts in Michigan.

Last week, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave for further appeal in an evenly divided 3-3 ruling; Justice Brian Zahra did not participate as he was on the Court of Appeals panel at the intermediate appellate court.

Justice Marilyn Kelly wrote a thoughtful dissent, noting the case presented issues of jurisprudential significance.  She is not conviced that the Court of Appeals properly concluded that the New York order was not entitled to the full faith and credit of the Wayne County family court.  Justice Kelly noted that bio-dad did have proper standing in the New York family court that issued the order of filiation.  Also, she noted that this order was issued and affirmed on appeal in New York prior to any paternity action being filed in Wayne County.

For these reasons, she would have granted leave to appeal so that the issues presented in the case could be resolved.  For now, this question will continue to percolate throughout the family courts of our state.

DNA has long been available to determine paternity.  The Michigan legislature, however, in both the child custody act and the paternity act, has been reluctant to allow such conclusive test results to disrupt an established family.

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High Court Rules Religious Mom Cannot Homeschool

Admittedly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court's recent decision favoring public school over homeschooling by Mother does not bind any of the courts in our jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, the ruling is instructive for anyone wrangling with family court issues.

This blog tracked the dispute in an earlier post as the case was submitted to the High Court following oral arguments.

Here are the basic facts: Post-divorce, Mother was homeschooling her daughter over Father's objection.  The religious component of Mom's in-home curriculum gave Dad indigestion, so he made an appointment with his divorce lawyer.

The family court appointed a Guardian Ad Litem to review the matter and make a recommendation to the judge.  The GAL concluded that public school was in the best interest of the minor child and so ruled the family court judge.

On appeal, Mother broadly challenged the judge's power to do so, raising a host of religious-based First Amendment arguments. The NH Supreme Court affirmed the family court on narrow grounds, finding that within the context of this particular dispute, the family court's discretionary powers were properly exercised in favor of what it determined was in the best interests of the parties' daughter.

The "best interest" determination included attendance at the local public school.  The child was ordered to progressively integrate into the public school curriculum, starting with three 5th grade classes.

Some readers will recognize this dynamic.  In his petition, Father alleged that due to the Mother's religious-based schooling, and through a complete immersion into Mother's church, daughter became withdrawn from Father's world (i.e. his new wife and child).  His officially stated fear was that his daughter was becoming isolated within Mother's home, and within her church, and this isolation was preventing her development.

For her part, Mother proclaimed that the additional contact between Father and daughter, and daughter's introduction into the public school system had a negative impact on the daughter, and that daughter (along with Mother) was suffering "extreme difficulty" with the court-ordered lifestyle modification.

In the end, the NH Supreme Court was not persuaded by Mother's high-flying, SCOTUS-citing First Amendment arguments.  The High Court ruled that it was the mandate of the family court to call the balls and strikes in this parenting dispute.

I, for one, feel very sorry for this now-confused little girl.  Not only is she being thrust, perhaps too late, into the main stream of our culture, she is also contending with her Father's new family; all within the context of her Mother's teachings, such as they are.

When parents have joint legal custody but cannot agree on basic issues of schooling and domicile, it is one of the saddest specters in the modern family court.

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New Hampshire Supreme Court Reviews Family Court Decision on Home Schooling

Custody issues are almost always best-decided by parents outside the courthouse.  Sometimes, however, a school choice dispute drives post-divorce parents into the courtroom.

In a case percolating through New Hampshire, a family court judge endorsed a parenting plan between feuding parents that featured public school over home-schooling by the mother.  The case was argued before the New Hampshire Supreme Court last week with a decision expected soon.

Mother, Brenda Voydatch, claims a constitutional First Amendment right to direct her daughter's education in accord with her deeply-held religious beliefs.  Father, on the other hand, petitioned the family court for an order that his daughter attend public school.  The family court judge appointed a guardian ad litem for the child who recommended the switch to public school.

Father knows best; for now.

This case has been acquiring headlines while burning through the NH appellate courts.  The parents have already tested their respective positions on the school issue in a full-blown custody trial resulting in joint legal custody, with "physical custody" to the child's mother.

Mother attacked the family court's reliance on the so-called expert testimony of the GAL, an admitted non-expert in the comparative pedagogies sought by the parents.  Mother paid her lawyers to be troubled by the court's apparently exclusive reliance on his GAL; a sort-of "judge-in-the-field".

For their part, father's lawyers have scoffed at the notion that any constitutional issues are presented in the case at all. Father sees the family court's public school ruling as an example of tough decision-making; family court style.   His pleadings also assert that Mother has exhibited an excessive, Christian, religiosity in her curriculum that has impeded their children's socialization; read "secularization".

The dispute is certainly philosophical, if not constitutional.  Stay tuned per usual as we await the outcome of the case and report back to you.

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Adultery in the Marital Bed

Please; Not in the Marital Bed

Always poor judgment, sometimes an adulterous liason makes it into the marital bed.  If the cuckholded spouse learns of the at-home trist, the ensuing divorce is very nasty.

This circumstance was recently featured in the NYT.  The article is of note in this blog mostly because it quotes a well-known Michigan divorce attorney; Richard Roane of Grand Rapids.

With New York finally following the rest of the states in 2009, all 50-states now have "no fault" divorce laws on the books.  Each state is different, however, as to how adultery, if and when proven, is factored into the divorce judgment.

The Michigan Penal Code has long-contained a chapter on adultery, defined as, "the sexual intercourse of 2 persons, either of whom is married to a third person." The scope of the criminal conduct includes divorced but cohabiting persons. The statute requires the cuckolded spouse to swear-in as the complaining witness and has a brief statute of limitation; one year.

The adultery statute merged into the penal code in 1931. The caselaw on this "consensual" crime goes back to 1884, in a case from Berrien County; People v Hendrickson.  That case stands for the evidentiary proposition that the testimony of the un-married participant in an adulterous union (the "other woman") can supply the requisite testimony to support a conviction, subject of course, to cross examination.

In the here and now of 2011, Michigan's family courts have adhered to the "no-fault" provisions of the divorce statutes. Adultery is now a matter of private morals, with family court judges free to exercise their discretion regarding the weight to put on allegations of adultery and their attendant consequences in matters of child custody and property division.

State Senator Ron Jelinek has proposed legislation seeking to abolish adultery as a felony.  The proposed legislation, however, has not gone anywhere since being referred to the Senate's judiciary committee shortly after its introduction in February 2009.

Occasionally, the adultery statute is cited in civil cases seeking to apply what is known as the "wrongful conduct" rule which blocks a plaintiff's attempt to gain from an adulterous relationship.

Immoral, but all too common, adultery has always posed a serious threat to the traditional family unit. Adultery, however, is a rarely charged felony. Thus, it's persistence within the penal code, particularly the anti-cohabitation provision, bloats the Michigan Compiled Laws with anachronistic provisions. Transgressions are best addressed within the discretion of the family court judges.

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Email Snooping by Spouse Results in Felony Criminal Charges

Oakland County Prosecutor Jessica Cooper has elected to prosecute a Rochester Hills man for accessing his wife’s email account. The emails were accessed from a computer that the husband purchased for family use.

The criminalization of conduct involving computers and privacy has had federal and state law components. For example, in the federal realm, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act was initially passed to proscribe electronic eavesdropping and was significantly expanded in 1986 from traditional “wired” forms of electronic communication, to include all forms of digital electronic communication.

A few years earlier, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act outlawed electronic espionage. The federal computer crime scheme also features several “technology-neutral” provisions allowing prosecution for a variety of criminal acts involving a computer.

By creating a statutory right to privacy in Internet communications, the federal law creates an expectation of privacy in our digital transmissions and provides a tool for selective prosecution.

But does that expectation of privacy extend to a marital home? To the family computer?

A Rochester Hills woman, Clara Walker, is the complaining witness in the Oakland County case against her third (former) husband, Leon Walker. The husband purchased a family computer and set-up a gmail account for his wife. Shortly thereafter, suspecting his wife was conducting an affair with her second husband, Mr. Walker accessed his spouse’s gmail account to get the proof.

Apparently, his suspicions were well-founded as the couple was divorced last year.

The price of this confirmation, however, was high. Walker has been charged with unauthorized access to a computer; a five-year felony charge due to Walker's circumstances. The case, charged early last year, has kicked around the 52/3rd District Court and the Oakland County Circuit Court since March, surviving the defendant's motion to dismiss.  Trial has been scheduled for Valentines Day.

The unauthorized computer access provisions of the Michigan Penal Code under which Walker has been charged are part of a 1979 statute designed to combat identity theft and computer hacking.  The provisions in the act create a presumption that access to another person’s computer file or digitized data was unauthorized. Various access or password-related exceptions are available to rebut the statutory presumption.

Two prior convictions, or an amount involved in the crime between $1000 but less than $20,000, elevates this computer crime from a misdemeanor to a felony.  Cooper has received criticism for charging an individual for alleged conduct which was resolved in family court. As she'll tell you; "happens all the time."

The case recently began receiving national attention when Walker, formerly an IT professional for Oakland County, cast Attorney Ray Cassarr aside in favor of "Feiger Law".  Figures.

Mr. Walker’s trial, over which Oakland Circuit Judge Martha Anderson will preside, should present some interesting evidence. The private family circumstances leading to the Walker's divorce proceedings may be deemed relevant to the criminal case.  Also, given the way the statute is worded, some interesting defenses can be presented to a jury. Among them, the defense counsel could focus the jury on whether a spouse’s separate email account on a family computer is private and whether there is an expectation of privacy in such an account when your husband has the password.

Any conviction will most likely be appealed.  We here at the Law Blogger will keep an eye on this one for you.  Expect updates.

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Felony Child Support Cases Get Review by Michigan Supreme Court

Last week, the Michigan Supreme Court granted leave on three cases challenging the constitutionality of the Felony Non-support Act; the statute criminalizing the failure to pay timely child support to the custodial parent.

This blog has covered the felony child support issue relative to the People v Likine case from Oakland County Circuit Court.  That case, along with People v Harris (from the Muskegon Circuit Court) and People v Parks (Ingham County), were granted leave for further appeal. 

A decision from the Supreme Court is expected sometime in 2011.

In Harris, Justice Robert Young, Jr. dissented from the majority of his colleagues in granting leave on the grounds that the appellant pled guilty in the trial court, cutting a deal on his child support payments to avoid jail.

One of the defenses that will be addressed in all three pending cases is whether a child support payor charged with this felony can raise the issue of his or her “inability to pay” in the criminal court.  Of course that defense is often raised in family court. 

Once you’ve been charged with felony child support, however, the “inability to pay” defense is unavailable per the Michigan Court of Appeals holding in the published case of People v Adams.  In granting leave for further appeal, the High Court expressly directed the parties to address the constitutionality of the Adams holding.

Generally, if you are having difficulty keeping your child support obligation current, you should immediately seek relief in the family court before you build an arrearage. 

An arrearage, if significant, can lead to a felony charge.  Technically, a day late and a dollar short is all that is required by the prosecutor to charge a case.

If you’ve already been charged, then you can still attempt to seek relief from the family court in the form of a reduced ongoing monthly obligation and, with the payee-parent’s consent, a waiver of interest and service fees.  There must be some basis for modification other than you simply ignoring your obligation.

We will keep our readers updated on this strand of cases.

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Change of Domicile Case from Clarkston Gets Supreme Court Treatment

One of the saddest things in a divorce proceeding is when a parent moves the family court for permission to change the domicile of the minor children.  When that occurs, not only is the family rocked by the initial shock of divorce, the future relationship with the parent left behind is placed in jeopardy.

A case from Clarkston, MI is instructive on the factors considered when such a motion is brought before the family court judge.

In Sunde v Sunde, mother petitioned the court to change domicile.  After considering evidence presented during a hearing on the issue, Family Court Judge Mary Ellen Brennan denied the motion.  Although mother's application for  leave to appeal was denied by the Court of Appeals, the Michigan Supreme Court issued an order remanding the case to the family court for further evidentiary proceedings.

Specifically, the Supreme Court found that the lower court record was incomplete because evidence of domestic violence was not proffered.  Domestic violence is one of the five statutory factors the family court must consider when deciding a domicile motion.  The high court also instructed the lower court to consider "up-to-date information or evidence of other changes in circumstance arising since the trial court's most recent order."  The first time around, the parents' attorneys did not make these requisite offers of proof.

Essentially, the Supreme Court has allowed mother a second evidentiary bite at the "domicile" apple.  The fate of the Sunde children continues to hang in the balance.

As in all family court cases that are brought to trial, the family court judge is charged with deciding what is in the children's best interest rather than weighing the competing interests of the parents.  Hopefully, after hearing all the evidence on each statutory factor, the path becomes clear to the judge.

This case pits long-time Clarkston-area attorney Lawrence Russell against Ann-Marie Okros, also from the Clarkston area.

Our firm has an excellent track-record of prevailing in domicile trials.  If you or a family member would like a free consultation on this, or any other family law issue, use the contact information below to schedule an appointment.

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Family Court's Custody Rulings Must Cite Findings

Last Thursday, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed a custody ruling of the Eaton County Family Court.  The tortured case, Wilbur v Carter, arose from a paternity suit, not a divorce.

The couple in this case conducted a protracted custody battle over their now 11-year old child.  The case features just about every tool available to the family court judge: supervised parenting time; temporary orders; in camera interviews with the child (twice) and evidentiary hearings.

The family court made a series of custody rulings in Father's favor over the years, keeping Mother's custody hopes alive by scheduling review hearings.  Father had been awarded sole legal custody and the stated purpose of the review hearings were to determine whether joint legal custody could be reinstituted.

Although the unpublished decision does not contain the underlying facts, the family court judge apparently did not approve of Mother's life style, removing her as a joint legal custodian of her child, and ordering supervised parenting time with Mother.

Over the past seven years, the parents kept filing motions for custody.  The lower court flip-flopped on the issue, alternating between temporary orders of sole legal custody to Father; then switching back to joint custody.  What troubled the Court of Appeals was that none of the requirements contained in the Child Custody Act were followed.

Before a family court judge changes custody, it must first determine whether an "established custodial environment" exists with either, or both, parents.  This term is defined in the custody act to mean:

if over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort. The age of the child, the physical environment, and the inclination of the custodian and the child as to permanency of the relationship shall also be considered.

The Eaton County Family Court neglected to make this determination in the case.  This is important because a court's determination of an established custodial environment determines the burden of proof which the moving parent must satisfy before a change in custody can be made.

In addition, the Court of Appeals was also disturbed because the lower court failed to make any determination that a "change of circumstances" or "just cause" existed to justify the requested custody modification.  Finally, it also reversed the family court because it made no findings of fact based on the 11 statutory custody factors set forth in the custody act.

Often, family courts feel constrained by their crowded dockets and the sometimes "informal" nature of the family court.  Attorneys foster this environment by allowing decisions on custody matters without the requisite findings by the court.

This case stands for the proposition that a family court cannot properly change custody without first: determining whether an established custodial environment exists; then determining whether the requisite "change of circumstances" exists; and finally making a factual determination after an evidentiary hearing as to all 11-factors.

The case calls for good lawyering in each and every custody battle, regardless of the court's resources or the resources of the parties.

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2009 Michigan Child Custody Update

This post summarizes some of the more interesting 2009 family law decisions from the Michigan Court of Appeals dealing with child custody.

In 2009, the Court of Appeals looked at the interplay between the juvenile code and the child custody act in two important cases.  The first case discussed was published and thus binding precedent; the second case is unpublished and does not bind subsequent courts in Michigan.

In a case from Wayne County, In the Matter of A.P., Mother had sole custody of her child from a paternity action.  She was accused of abusing the child.  The resulting juvenile proceedings re-introduced the child’s biological father into the child’s life.  In the lengthily proceedings, the juvenile court’s rulings intersected and conflicted with prior orders from the family court.

The Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court supersedes the family court:

Once a juvenile court assumes jurisdiction over a child and the child becomes a ward of the court under the juvenile code, the juvenile court’s orders supersede all previous orders, including custody orders entered by another court, even if inconsistent or contradictory. In other words, the previous custody orders affecting the minor become dormant, in a metaphoric sense, during the pendency of the juvenile proceedings, but when the juvenile court dismisses its jurisdiction over the child, all those previous custody orders continue to remain in full force and effect. 

 DHS v Gunther is significant as it also addresses jurisdiction via the juvenile code over children that are already under the jurisdiction of the family court.  In this case, Mother had “physical custody” of the parties’ children resulting from a divorce judgment.

The Gunther children came to the attention of DHS due to school truancy allegations resulting in temporary placement of the children with their father.  Mother moved for their immediate return, asserting that the juvenile court referee could not alter the children’s “established custodial environment” without first conducting a hearing, as required by the Child Custody Act.

Again, the Court of Appeals held that once a juvenile court assumes jurisdiction over a minor pursuant to the juvenile code, the juvenile court’s orders supersede all other previous orders; including those issued from a family court.

In Pobanz v Pobanz, the Court of Appeals decided the issue of whether a 17-year old could be court-ordered to participate in parenting time within the context of a custody challenge.  As in the two other cases discussed in this post, Pobanz also featured a co-occurring neglect petition in the juvenile court. 

The trial court stated that it would not force a 17-year to participate in parenting time when she stated that she did not want to see her Father.  Although the Pobanz panel agreed with the trial court that a seventeen year old’s reasonable custody preference is given wide-deference, it held that the lower court erred by not conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the many other statutory factors supported the decision.  The case was sent back to the Huron County Family Court to conduct the hearing.

Surprisingly, the Court of Appeals allowed the trial court to change judges based on the subsequent juvenile case.  The family court judge was first assigned to the Pobanz family in the divorce proceedings, but the trial court transferred the divorce, and Father’s custody motion, to the judge presiding over the subsequent juvenile proceedings.

This ruling is interesting in that it seems to violate the “one family, one judge” concept set forth in 1996 with the creation of the family courts across the state.  According to the reorganization statute, multiple cases involving the same family were all to be assigned to the first judge in the county assigned to that family.

In Bonner v Bonner, the Court of Appeals decided the issue of whether a child could be compelled to testify at hearing on his parents’ competing change of custody motions.  The case featured the open-court testimony of the parties’ minor child, limited to matters of alleged abuse by the Mother.

The case is most interesting for featuring the testimony of a well-respected psychologist that had observed the parties and child at the court hearing(s).  The psychologist then provided testimony to the family court as to his observations of both parents and the child.  Note: The family court judge did not find the child’s testimony about the conditions of his Mother’s home to be credible.

Also, the case is significant in that a child was compelled to testify in order to satisfy his parents’ right to due process.  Unlike in camera testimony of children called into a judge’s chambers to express their custodial preference under seal, this case featured the open-court testimony of a son against his own Mother.

Next, the Court of Appeals, in Roguska v Roguska, examined whether a family court could reject a settlement agreement on custody reached at court-ordered mediation by both parties and their respective attorneys.  In that case, the Mother subsequently attested that her husband lied during mediation, that she and her husband had serious communication problems, and that she subsequently obtained a PPO against the husband.

The Roguska panel held that such facts freed the family court from having to follow the settlement agreement on the custody issue.  In cases of domestic violence, arbitration and mediation are allowed, but disfavored due to the coercion that can sometimes be brought to bear against the victim of abuse.

The case of Hoeve v Hoeve continues the series of Court of Appeals decisions holding that the parents' school-district decision may be, by itself, proper cause to change custody.  In Hoeve, the pre-school child spent week-on-week-off with mom and dad.  Father sought and was awarded sole physical custody, however, once the child became eligible for kindergarten.

The parents lived about 70-miles apart.  Father's motion to acquire sole physical custody succeeded at trial and was affirmed on appeal.

According to family law appellate attorney Scott Bassett, the Hoeve case suggests that parental school choice disputes is the "new frontier" in child custody litigation.

This is a summary of what came out of the Court of Appeals on matters of custody in 2009.  Many other decisions addressed the important issues of domicile and parenting time which will be addressed in future posts.

Only time will tell what 2010 will bring.

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